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Starlink, deepfakes and open sources: holding the line of evidence

Two parallel developments are redefining West Africa’s information environment. The first is material: Starlink terminals circulate among armed groups, including JNIM and Islamic State West Africa Province, which use them to coordinate and spread propaganda from areas without coverage. Niger and Chad legalised the service in March 2025, but smuggling of terminals persists. The strategic consequence: telecom shutdowns, long used as a security lever, are losing their effect.

The second development is cognitive

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies records 189 documented disinformation campaigns on the continent, nearly four times more than in 2022; Russia sponsors 80 of them, targeting more than twenty-two countries. Synthetic production now adds to this: in Burkina Faso, AI-generated videos have built a messianic image of the head of state, circulated with an equally generated soundtrack. Six African countries vote in 2027.

What OSINT can and cannot do

Open-source intelligence is not about collecting more, but about establishing what is verifiable. Three rules of method serve as a minimum doctrine:

  • Traceability: every claim points to an identifiable, dated source. A figure without a source is not data; it is a rumour with a number.
  • Separation: verified fact, estimate and hypothesis must not appear in the same typeface. Confusing them is the information adversary’s first victory.
  • Reproducibility: an analysis whose method is published can be challenged and corrected. That is what distinguishes it from authorised opinion.

One practical consequence

For a state as for a company, the critical capability is no longer access to information — it is abundant — but the ability to authenticate content quickly before acting. That requires trained teams, written verification procedures, and acceptance of a delay: reacting within ten minutes to unauthenticated content is risk-taking, not responsiveness.

This is the methodological line of the Circle’s tools: every entry in the Risk calendar, the Weak signals radar and the Defence partnerships atlas cites its source, and the Strategic Vulnerability Index publishes its calculation method.

Sources